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Railways began operating in Australia in the 1850s and, in many ways,
they transformed transport in the country. They became vital links be-
tween Australia’s cities and ports and the rural hinterland, facilitated ex-
port expansion, and were used by governments to pursue social and polit-
ical objectives (Productivity Commission [PC] 1999).
However, much has changed since those early days. As more air, land,
and sea transport options have developed, so the role of rail has changed.
Although railways in Australia still play a signiﬁcant role in the intrastate
transport of bulk commodities and general freight along major corridors,
and in urban transport, they are not as successful in other areas. Changing
modal shares with the decline of rail in part reﬂect inherent advantages of
other transport modes, particularly technological improvements. How-
ever, there have also been concerns that the poor performance of rail con-
tributed to its own decline. Indeed, one Australian state government told
the PC during its 1999 inquiry into rail reform in Australia that a lack of
rail (and maritime) productivity has resulted in an overreliance on air and
road transport in Australia (PC 1999, 1).
Concerns about the performance of rail led to a number of railway re-
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assistance.Australia that reforms have occurred. Railways in many countries have un-
dergone signiﬁcant changes in aspects of their organizational structures,
ownership, and access arrangements over this period. Widely diﬀering ap-
proaches to rail reform are evident, both across countries (discussed brieﬂy
below) and in diﬀerent jurisdictions in Australia (the focus of this paper).
Reforms have included structural separation (both vertical and horizon-
tal), the introduction of commercial disciplines (corporatization and priva-
tization), and arrangements for third-party access to track infrastructure.
The wide range of reforms being implemented raises the question of
whether one approach is superior to another. Using Australian railways as
an example, this paper argues that because rail networks diﬀer in terms of
their economic characteristics and the challenges they face, it is important
that individual reform packages be tailored to each network.
11.2 International Reforms
During the 1990s, reforms in some countries, such as Great Britain
(England, Scotland, and Wales), New Zealand, and Argentina, involved
increased private-sector participation.1 In Great Britain, for example,
twenty-ﬁve passenger service operations were established under franchis-
ing arrangements and the track, signals, and stations were sold to the pri-
vate sector.2Structural reform across these countries has involved diﬀerent
combinations of vertical and horizontal separation (table 11.1).
Other countries have adopted reforms that change structures within
government-owned railways. For instance, in 1994 the publicly owned
Netherlands Railway was separated vertically into track infrastructure and
train operations, with the latter divided into four commercial business
units (passenger, freight, stations, real estate). Some new private entrants
have also entered the Dutch market.
Table 11.2 provides an overview of the structure and ownership of the
railways in selected countries.3
Many teething problems have been associated with these reforms. A
notable example has been Great Britain. An apparent deterioration of ser-
vices and major safety problems—as evident from several rail crashes in
the 1990s, as well as the Hatﬁeld rail crash in October 2000—led experts to
blame the fragmentation of the system. One transport specialist suggested
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1. Discussion of rail reform in Argentina, Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and
other European countries can be found in World Bank (1996), PC (1999), Kain (1998), Bow-
ers (1996), Jansson and Cardebring (1989), and European Conference of Ministers of Trans-
port ([ECMT] 2001).
2. The British government released a white paper in 1992 proposing changes to the railways.
The Railways Act of 1993 allowed the structural reform of the railways, which were sold or
franchised in 1997.
3. PC (1999) benchmarked Australia’s railways with selected systems in Europe, America,
and Japan. Railways in other Asian countries were not examined.Table 11.1 Deﬁnitions Relating to Structural Separation
Deﬁnition
Structural separation Separation of businesses into discrete legal entities.
Horizontal separation Occurs either by product (freight and passenger
services) or by geographic area (interstate, regional,
and urban railways).
Vertical separation Separation of functional levels (track infrastructure
and train operations).
Above track, or train operations Provision of rail freight and passenger transport
services involving locomotives and other
rollingstock.
Below track, or track infrastructure Physically ﬁxed rail facilities such as track, sleepers,
signals, terminals, and yards.
Table 11.2 Overview of Structure and Ownership of Overseas Railways, 1999
Country Structure Train Operator Track Infrastructure
Argentina Horizontally separated and verti- Franchisees Government
cally integrated
Canada Horizontally separated (by func- Various private Various private
tion) and vertically integrated with 
access for passenger services
Germany Horizontal and vertical separation  Governments and  Government
of accounts private
Great  Horizontally and vertically  Franchisees Private
Britain separated
Japan Horizontally separated (by func- Franchisees and  Government with 
tion) and vertically integrated  government freight  franchisees having 
with access for freight services operator control of track
The  Horizontally and vertically  Government and  Government
Netherlands separated various private
New  Horizontally and vertically  Private Government (leased 
Zealand integrated for nominal rent)
Sweden Horizontally and vertically  Government and  Government
separated various private
United States Horizontally separated (by func- Various private Various private
tion) and vertically integrated 
with access for passenger services
Source: PC (1999, E2).that the complex structures created by privatization generated some prob-
lems, particularly relating to lines of accountability (Grayling 2000). Oth-
ers have noted problems such as the setting of inappropriate benchmarks,
shortcomings in liability regimes, and weak investment incentives (The
Economist, 3 July 1999, 57–60; Trace 1999).
11.3 Australian Reforms
The development of railways in Australia since the 1850s4 reﬂects the
fact that Australia is a federation of states. There is a national (common-
wealth) government and eight state and territory governments.5
Historically, railways have been (and many are today) under the juris-
diction of state governments. At the start of the 1990s the Australian rail
system was characterized by integrated (state-owned) railways providing
passenger and freight services in their respective jurisdictions.
Australian National (AN; owned by the commonwealth government)
provided long-distance passenger services on the mainland, freight ser-
vices across jurisdictions, and intrastate freight services in South Australia
and Tasmania.
The state systems accounted for most rail freight transported. Of the
more than 66 billion net-ton kilometers of rail freight transported in 1996–
1997, for example, about three-quarters were accounted for by state rail-
ways. Queensland was the largest individual freight carrier, transporting
about 43 percent of the total in that year. The busiest routes (in terms of
net-ton kilometers) tended to be along the north-south corridor, that is, be-
tween Melbourne and Sydney and between Brisbane and Melbourne.
However, rail had the most signiﬁcant share of freight transport on the
route between Perth and Adelaide (Industry Commission [IC] 1991).
One of the legacies of the historical pattern of development of the rail-
ways was a degree of parochialism that resulted in a lack of standardiza-
tion of rail gauges. Standardization of the interstate network was only com-
pleted in 1995 when the Melbourne-to-Adelaide broad-gauge route was
converted to standard gauge.
A number of factors drove reform in Australian railways in the 1990s.
These included the following:
• Increasing pressure on government budgets to ﬁnance railway deﬁcits,
subsidies, and investment (the total amount of explicit subsidies paid
to railways by state governments in 1997–1998, e.g., exceeded Aus-
tralian $2.3 billion, representing 4 to 5 percent of the outlays of some
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4. Rail reform in Australia is discussed further in PC (1999), Salerian (1999), and Scrafton
(2001).
5. The states and territories of Australia are New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland,
South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory, and Australian Capital
Territory.governments; PC 1999, 263). In 1996–1997, the rail deﬁcit was A$1.36
billion (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communi-
cations, Transport, and Microeconomic Reform [HORSCCTMR]
1998, 110), and total commonwealth, state, and local government in-
vestment in rail was about A$1.6 billion (HORSCCTMR, 112).
• Pressure on railway freight rates arising from increasing intermodal
competition (this increased competition was due to the removal of the
legislated monopoly previously given to rail for the carriage of certain
bulk commodities,6 and improvements in road transport technology
and infrastructure).
• Pressure on railway freight rates from increasing competition in down-
stream markets for some commodities.
• The introduction of a National Competition Policy.7
A wide range of diﬀerent structural, ownership, and access arrange-
ments was introduced by the states in the 1990s (table 11.3). Queensland
has retained a single, government-owned railway that provides freight and
passenger services and maintains rollingstock and track infrastructure.
This entity was, however, corporatized in 1995–1996. New South Wales
(NSW), on the other hand, structurally separated its State Rail Authority
in 1996, initially into four government-owned businesses (with responsi-
bility for urban and nonurban passenger services, freight, track infrastruc-
ture, and track maintenance), of which three were corporatized.
In other states, reforms have led to greater participation by the private
sector through franchising of urban and nonurban passenger rail services
(Victoria) and privatization of freight operations (Victoria, Western Aus-
tralia). The commonwealth government privatized parts of the AN rail-
ways and has plans to sell the National Rail Corporation (NRC), which as-
sumed responsibility for AN’s interstate freight operations in 1993. The
interstate track was transferred to a new federal authority, the Australian
Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), in 1998. On the east-west corridor across
Australia, private operators now compete directly with the government op-
erator in niche markets.8 Overall the number of private railways rose from
six in 1991 to nineteen in 1999.
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6. Industry Commission (1991) and PC (1999) discuss the restrictions that existed on the
intrastate carriage of particular commodities. For example, rail was required to transport coal
(in NSW and Queensland) and domestic grains and petroleum (in Victoria, Queensland, and
Western Australia).
7. In 1995 the Council of Australian Governments agreed to implement a package of mea-
sures to extend competition policies to previously exempt sectors of the economy. A Compe-
tition Principles Agreement established principles for structural reform of public monopolies,
competitive neutrality between the public and private sectors, prices oversight of government
business enterprises, regimes to provide access to essential facilities, and reviews of legislation
restricting competition.
8. The former AN system now consists of two private operators (Australia Southern Rail-
road, Australian Transport Network), a corporatized government freight operator (NRC), a
private passenger-train operator (Great Southern Railway), and a government track author-
ity (ARTC).As with the experience overseas, these reforms have not been without
problems. In particular, problems similar to those in Great Britain seem
to have arisen following structural reforms in NSW, where a series of rail
accidents and concerns over track maintenance standards resulted in an
inquiry into the safety of the network. This safety audit, released in April
2000, noted that poor coordination among the new government-owned rail
agencies had impeded the system’s safety performance, and that a cultural
change was required to allow the “eﬀective delivery” of safety initiatives
(D. Humphries, “Safety Gets Back Seat on Trains, Audit Finds,” Sydney
Morning Herald, 5 April 2000). In 2001, the businesses responsible for
track access (Rail Access Corporation) and maintenance (Rail Services
Australia) were merged into a single entity, the Rail Infrastructure Corpo-
ration, subject to direction from the NSW transport minister.
Until recently, attempts to privatize the NRC and the NSW Freight Rail
Corporation (FreightCorp) had stalled. The sale of NRC was complicated
by the fact that three governments—the commonwealth, NSW, and Vic-
toria—had joint ownership of the corporation.9 Disputes over access to
Victorian terminals and tracks initially delayed privatization (M. Skulley,
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Table 11.3 Structure and Ownership of Australian Railways, 1999
Jurisdiction Structure Train Operator Track Infrastructure
Commonwealth Vertically separated Government and  Government
various private
New South Wales Horizontally and vertically  Government and  Government
separated various privatea
Victoria Horizontally separated and  Private Government (lease 
vertically integrated urban and nonurban)
Queensland Horizontally and vertically inte- Government Government
grated (with access for third 
parties)
Western  Horizontally separated and ver- Government and  Government (lease 
Australia tically integrated (with access  private nonurban)
for third parties)
South Australia Horizontally separated and  Government and  Government (lease 
vertically integrated privatea nonurban)
Tasmania Horizontally and vertically  Private Private
integrated
Source: PC (1999).
aNSW’s FreightCorp has won a major coal haul contract in South Australia and NRC is operating intra-
state services in NSW.
9. NRC is 70 percent owned by the commonwealth, with minority stakes held by NSW (20
percent) and Victoria (10 percent).“Full Steam Ahead: Rail Freight Sell-Oﬀ,” Australian Financial Review, 1
March 1999, p. 3). These issues were resolved in 1999. In NSW, the Labor
government faced opposition (particularly within its own party) to a pro-
posal, made in September 2000, to privatize FreightCorp in parallel with
the NRC. Concerns were mainly related to job losses and the possible im-
pact of the sale on the regions. The NSW government eventually received
support for the privatization proposal from an Upper House committee of
Parliament and a Country Labor Party conference.10
The commonwealth and relevant state governments have now agreed to
link the two businesses before selling them by the end of 2001. It is intended
that the merged entity would have two divisions—a bulk haulage arm
(FreightCorp’s business) and an intermodal arm for NRC’s interstate
freight services. However, concerns have been expressed that the twin sale
could substantially lessen competition, with the merged entity holding a
high proportion of standard-gauge rollingstock. The governments have in-
dicated that any competition issues raised by the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) would be addressed through the sale
process (Batchelor et al. 2001).11
11.4 Performance of Australia’s Railways
Reforms in the 1990s transformed the structure and operations of Aus-
tralia’s railways. There is now greater competition between railways and
more private-sector participation in some corridors. The PC (1999) found
that there were signiﬁcant improvements in the productivity of (govern-
ment-owned) railways providing freight and passenger services over the pe-
riod 1989–1990 to 1997–1998.
Figure 11.1 indicates that the average annual growth in (total factor)
productivity of Australia’s railways of around 8 percent was greater than
that of Canada, Japan, and the United States.
Freight customers beneﬁted from this improvement in productivity. Real
freight rates fell 30 percent between 1990 and 1998. This is comparable
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10. The NSW Labor government support for the sale of FreightCorp was based on com-
monwealth government decisions to privatize NRC but prohibit the sale of NRC to Freight-
Corp. The NSW government argued that the privatization of NRC would have left Freight-
Corp vulnerable to “cherry-picking” of its most proﬁtable contracts by NRC. After much
debate, the NSW Country Labor Conference in November 2000 voted to condemn the priva-
tization of NRC, but to make it a condition of sale of FreightCorp that it be sold to the same
bidder as NRC (D. Murphy, “FreightCorp Sell-Oﬀ Wins Crucial Labor Support,” Sydney
Morning Herald, 13 November 2000). An Upper House committee of the NSW Parliament
also made several recommendations about conditions to be attached to the privatization,
which were incorporated in legislation (NSW Legislative Council 2001).
11. The Trade Practices Act of 1974 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that have the eﬀect
or likely eﬀect of substantially lessening competition in a substantial market. The ACCC has
the power to reject mergers that would substantially lessen competition, but can also author-
ize these where there is suﬃcient public beneﬁt.286 Helen Owens
Fig. 11.1 Productivity levels of freight and passenger systems
Source: PC (1999, xxiv).
with decreases in Canada (33 percent) and the United States (26 percent)
between 1990 and 1997.
However, while Australia has narrowed the gap in productivity, there re-
mains a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Australia’s level of productivity in 1998 was
about two-thirds that of the best-performing countries (in 1997).
Some of the diﬀerence is due to factors that inherently disadvantage
Australia, such as scale of operation. However, technical eﬃciency (pro-
ductivity adjusted for the eﬀect of scale) remains 30 percent below that of
the best-performing countries.
11.5 Future Reforms
As discussed in section 11.4, improvements in the productivity of Aus-
tralian railways had occurred in the 1990s but there was room for further
improvement. Reforms during the decade had contributed to the improved
performance but the PC inquiry report (PC 1999) considered that more
needed to be done to ensure further productivity gains in Australia. It ar-
gued that a greater commercial focus and the harnessing of competitive
forces were the keys to ensuring further productivity gains. Numerous par-
ticipants to the inquiry agreed with this view.
While steps had been taken to corporatize the remaining government-
owned railways, the ongoing problems for these railways appear to reﬂect
the way the corporatization model has been implemented. Corporatization
aims to provide a public enterprise with similar objectives, incentives, and
sanctions to those of a private-sector ﬁrm (Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell1993, 300). The Hilmer Report noted ﬁve basic principles for the eﬀective
implementation of corporatization. These were clarity and consistency of
objectives, management authority, performance monitoring, eﬀective re-
wards and sanctions, and competitive neutrality.12
However, governments still subject their rail operators to multiple, often
conﬂicting objectives relating to social welfare, regional development, and
employment. Governments as shareholders face budget constraints and
are often reluctant to provide equity funding or to allow railways to bor-
row on their own behalf, even if justiﬁed commercially. Further, govern-
ments are often reluctant to maintain an arm’s-length relationship with
their railway boards because of political and community pressures.
Even in theory, limitations apply to the corporatization model. In par-
ticular, public ownership subjects governments and taxpayers to consider-
able commercial risks.
Thus, private-sector alternatives to government provision have an im-
portant role to play in overcoming these problems. These alternatives can
include contracting out and franchising. Competitive tendering and con-
tracting (CTC) allows the introduction of competition into the provision
of certain services and has been used increasingly by Australian railways,
particularly in areas such as maintenance. Competition is introduced
through the bidding process and so encourages providers to adopt eﬃcient
service-delivery methods. The main beneﬁts of CTC are seen to include
lower costs, improved service, and greater ﬂexibility (King 1994). However,
contract speciﬁcation is an important determinant of the success of CTC.
As well as specifying price, contracts need to contain incentives or condi-
tions to maintain service quality.
Franchising involves the government granting a franchisee the right to
operate a service for a ﬁxed period. It can generate further gains because
franchisees bear revenue risks, thus strengthening their incentives to im-
prove service quality and expand the size of the market.
Full privatization can, in theory, oﬀer a number of beneﬁts over public
ownership. Privately owned ﬁrms are said to have greater incentives and
ability than public enterprises to be cost eﬃcient, to make productive in-
vestments, and to be innovative and customer focused (see, e.g., Asterisis
1994). Privatization thus provides opportunities to change the leadership
and culture of rail enterprises and transfer risk fully to the private sector.
In Australia, the Tasmanian rail system and interstate nonurban pas-
senger systems have been privatized. The experience of privatization with
these systems is encouraging and supports privatizing freight railways
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12. In October 1992, a committee inquiry was established by the prime minister, with the
support of state and territory governments, on the need for a national competition policy and
its basic principles. The report of the inquiry (Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell 1993) became
known as the Hilmer Report, after the committee’s chairman Frederick G. Hilmer.operating in competitive markets, such as NRC and NSW’s Freight-
Corp.13 Scrafton (2001) argued that new entrants in freight and urban
passenger rail appeared to be turning around markets that previously had
been declining, with commitments to investment, new services, and cour-
ageous targets. For example, since purchasing Tasrail in 1997, the private
owners have increased traﬃc volumes signiﬁcantly, winning major con-
tracts to haul logs and containers. Tasrail’s revenue increased, while costs
fell, making the railway proﬁtable for the ﬁrst time in 130 years. The pri-
vate owners have invested heavily in new sleepers, communications sys-
tems, and replacement of the aging rollingstock. Likewise, some interstate
passenger routes began to generate positive margins following privatiza-
tion (PC 1999).
Competition can improve performance further. There are a number of
forms competition can take—both “in” the market and “for” the market.
Much of the rail network is already subject to intermodal competition
from road, air, or coastal shipping, or competition in downstream markets.
The diﬀerent forms of competition are summarized in table 11.4.
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Table 11.4 Deﬁnitions Relating to Competition
Deﬁnition
Intermodal competition Competition between rail and other modes of
transport, such as road and coastal shipping.
Competition “for” the market Competition between bidders tendering for the
exclusive right to provide a speciﬁed service over
a given period of time.
Competition “in” the market Competition between train operators for the
same customers on a given network (rail-on-rail
competition).
Competition for train schedules Competing demands by train operators for ac-
cess to the track infrastructure. This can occur
between train operators serving diﬀerent markets
(e.g., freight and passenger services), between op-
erators competing for the same customers, or be-
tween trains with diﬀerent origins/destinations
wishing to travel over common segments of the
network.
Competition in downstream markets Competition in markets that railways serve.
Yardstick competition Involves comparing the performance of organiza-
tions with similar objectives operating in separate
geographic markets.
13. The PC inquiry report recommended privatizing all remaining government-owned
freight operations, with special arrangements for the rollingstock on the main coal lines (PC
1999, 145–151).Competition can be facilitated by structural reform (e.g., vertical or hor-
izontal separation; table 11.1) and the introduction of regulatory arrange-
ments to enable access to track infrastructure. However, no single structure
or access regime is appropriate for all networks.
11.6 Decision-Making Framework
So how do governments decide which approach is appropriate in re-
forming their rail networks? The speciﬁcation of objectives and exami-
nation of the characteristics of the rail network can help in the decision-
making process. Taking these steps allows identiﬁcation of the forms
of competition and structural reform that may be appropriate in each
market.
Specifying the objectives of reform at the outset helps to identify the ra-
tionale for reform, and hence provides guidance on how best to implement
reform (and, indeed, helps to identify whether reform is needed at all). For
instance, the overarching objective of reform may be to have an eﬃcient
transport system meeting the freight and transport needs of a country, not
to raise revenue from the private sector or to increase the aggregate level of
service from railways. This implies that the extent to which each transport
mode is used in the transport system would depend on its economic merit.
Railways simultaneously compete with and complement other modes in
providing a seamless transport service.
The eﬃcient operation of railways is an important contributor to an eﬃ-
cient transport system. The sources of improved eﬃciency in railways—as
in other industries—are static and dynamic eﬃciency gains. Static gains
are achieved through one-oﬀ improvements to eliminate the sources of
x-ineﬃciency. This can involve making better use of existing labor, equip-
ment, and infrastructure. Dynamic eﬃciency gains involve continual im-
provement through innovation and, in the case of rail, continually opti-
mizing its position in the transport logistics chain.
In most instances rail reform packages implemented across countries
have delivered static eﬃciency gains. In New Zealand, for example, there
were  signiﬁcant improvements in labor productivity, asset utilization,
traﬃc levels, and proﬁt in the ﬁve years following privatization (PC 1999,
149). To some extent these are the “easy” gains. But dynamic eﬃciency is
likely to be more important to rail in the long run. Achieving greater dy-
namic eﬃciency is more diﬃcult as it is likely to involve fundamental
changes to the culture and operations of railways.
It is also important to understand the diﬀering economic characteristics
of individual rail networks. In a few markets, such as the transportation of
bulk commodities such as coal, railways are able to exercise market power
and extract monopoly rents from users. For other freight operations, rail-
ways may generate just suﬃcient earnings to be commercially viable and
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making and rely on government subsidies for survival.
In addition, network interface issues, which occur when a train from one
network needs access to another network, can potentially impede the eﬃ-
ciency of train operations and inﬂuence the appropriateness of diﬀerent
policy options. The extent of interface issues will depend on several factors,
including the number of trains from other networks seeking access, the
complexity of the network, and the level of traﬃc density.
Having identiﬁed objectives and network characteristics, the forms of
competition likely to be eﬀective in each network can be identiﬁed. Com-
petition “for” the market, as occurs with franchising, is typically suited to
natural monopoly situations where it is most cost eﬀective to have only one
provider of the rail service. In other markets, it may be possible to have
multiple train operators competing for the same customers—that is, com-
petition “in” the market (e.g., long-distance rail lines). This can encourage
market segmentation and product diversity. In other markets, intermodal
competition or competition in downstream markets may be suﬃcient to
promote operational eﬃciency.
Finally, the emphasis in rail reform on promoting various types of com-
petition is underpinned by structural reform. In essence, structural reform
involves breaking up established railways into separate entities, with sepa-
ration occurring on a geographic, functional (track, rollingstock, mainte-
nance), and/or product (passenger or freight) basis.
The potential beneﬁts of structural separation may include the promo-
tion of competition, facilitation of the regulation of natural monopoly el-
ements of the track, and the implementation of appropriate policies in
diﬀerent markets (PC 1999).
Separating train operations from the track (vertical separation) is de-
signed to facilitate competition between train operators for the same cus-
tomers and competition for train schedules. But vertical separation may
not be eﬀective in markets where there is limited scope for more than one
operator, or there is already eﬀective competition from other modes of
transport or competition in downstream markets (Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 1999). It may also result in
coordination and safety problems.
Separating railways by function or geography (horizontal separation)
can improve the eﬀectiveness of policies and regulatory regimes relating to
diﬀerent rail businesses. Contractual arrangements to meet noncommer-
cial objectives (social, regional, or environmental) can also be imple-
mented more readily. It also enables services to be franchised in order to
introduce competition “for” the market through periodic competitive
bidding.
The potential beneﬁts of structural separation need to be balanced
against the costs. The costs of structural separation potentially can include
290 Helen Owensloss of economies of scope, interface problems between networks, loss of
commercial sustainability, adverse eﬀects on safety, and adjustment
costs.14
11.7 Applying the Decision-Making Framework
The PC (1999) inquiry report into progress in rail reform applied this de-
cision-making framework to the Australian railway system. Based on their
economic characteristics, four diﬀerent types of rail network can be iden-
tiﬁed in Australia—urban passenger, regional, main coal lines, and the in-
terstate network. For each network the problems to be addressed and the
impediments to improved performance diﬀer, requiring diﬀering policy so-
lutions.
11.7.1 Urban Rail Passenger Networks
Urban rail passenger networks exist in the mainland state capital cities
of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, and Adelaide. These networks are
noncommercial and exist in their current form only because of continued
government support. In the markets served by these networks there is
strong intermodal competition from private motor vehicles and from al-
ternative public transport modes in some instances. There is no rail-on-rail
competition.
Urban rail passenger networks pose a variety of challenges to govern-
ments and their operators. These railways are often criticized for their de-
ﬁciencies in productive eﬃciency, large ﬁnancial deﬁcits, and poor service
quality. These problems are further compounded by the fact that urban rail
passenger services are highly visible to the public, often in need of capital
investment, and subject to industrial disputes.
Given the loss-making nature of these networks, governments ultimately
decide which services will be provided and the contribution users make to-
ward the cost of provision. The performance of the urban transport system
can be improved by ensuring that urban rail services fulﬁll an appropriate
role within the system (improving allocative eﬃciency) and then that those
services are provided at least cost to taxpayers (improving operational eﬃ-
ciency).
Allocative eﬃciency can be improved through the rigorous application
of the purchaser-provider framework. The purchaser-provider framework
separates the responsibility for deciding which goods and services are pro-
vided to the community from the responsibility for delivering the services
(PC 1999). Governments consider and decide on the choice and mix of
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14. PC (1999, 107–108) discusses the potential costs of vertical separation in more detail.
Further information can also be obtained from Kessides and Willig (1995); Brooks and But-
ton (1995); Thompson (1997); King (1997); OECD (1998); van de Velde and van Reeven
(1998); and OECD (1999).transport services purchased to promote stated objectives, rather than
leaving such decisions to railway management.15
Greater operational eﬃciency can be encouraged by generating compe-
tition for the market through contracting or franchising. This approach is
preferred to promoting competition between train operators. Urban rail
passenger services require that trains run frequently and to a complex
timetable. Coordination of services to meet the timetable is likely to be
more eﬀectively undertaken by one operator. In addition, the relatively
small size of many urban passenger networks in Australia limits the scope
for competition between train operators for the same customers.
Vertical integration can facilitate the franchising process and opera-
tional eﬃciency of urban passenger networks. Vertical separation is not
warranted because there are no beneﬁts to be obtained (through competi-
tion between train operators) to oﬀset the costs of separation. In addition,
accountability is also likely to be weakened in such a structure. If service
standards are not achieved or if accidents occur, a regulator will be re-
quired to apportion responsibility and impose sanctions. As noted by Kain
(1998), apportioning blame for poor performance may require consider-
able information and administration on the part of the regulator.
Horizontal separation of urban rail passenger networks from other rail
networks can facilitate the application of the purchaser-provider frame-
work by clearly delineating those services requiring government support
from other commercial rail operations and networks. In addition, it may
be worthwhile to horizontally separate the networks further into two or
more geographically based franchises to promote “yardstick” competi-
tion, provided the population size is suﬃcient to support such separation.16
The beneﬁts of further horizontal separation need to be balanced
against potential interface and coordination issues that may occur between
operators over shared segments of the network.17 It has been argued, in-
cluding by participants to the PC’s inquiry into rail reform (PC 1999), that
in some instances the horizontal separation of urban rail passenger net-
works from other rail networks is impracticable due to the interface issues
between them. However, there are examples both in Australia and overseas
of the use of contractual arrangements to overcome such problems. In Vic-
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15. The PC identiﬁed ﬁve stages in the implementation of the purchaser-provider frame-
work, including the speciﬁcation of policy objectives, speciﬁcation of rail services required to
promote the objectives, determination of the level and form of subsidy, delivery of speciﬁed
services, and costing of rail services (PC 1999, 12–16).
16. The establishment of the twenty-ﬁve horizontally separated passenger franchises in the
United Kingdom is an example. In Victoria, the U.K. approach was adopted with the hori-
zontal separation of the Melbourne urban train system into two franchises (Bayside Trains
and Hillside Trains).
17. In Australia, network interface issues are of particular concern in Sydney, where con-
gestion in the urban passenger network restricts the passage of freight trains. Interface issues
also arise between the interstate and regional networks, as well as between the main coal lines
and regional networks.toria, there are contractual arrangements between an urban passenger
operator in Melbourne, M-Train (formerly Bayside Trains), and interstate
and regional operators that allow the use of the urban network by nonur-
ban and freight trains. Similar arrangements also apply in the United
States (PC 1999, 110, E24). The balance of evidence indicates that the ben-
eﬁts that can be obtained from horizontally separating urban rail passen-
ger networks outweigh the cost of such contractual arrangements.
11.7.2 Regional Networks
Regional networks in Australia refer to those rail lines that extend from
the ports and capital cities into the regional areas as well as lines from re-
gional areas that connect into the interstate network. Within the regional
networks of NSW and Queensland are the main coal lines that are dis-
cussed separately below. The services provided by regional networks are
dominated by the transport of general freight and grains. The ﬁnancial
performance of these networks is mixed. Some networks have been able to
generate suﬃcient revenues to earn a commercial return, while others are
reliant on government support. In virtually all instances, the freight car-
ried on regional networks is subject to strong intermodal competition, es-
pecially from road transport.
The poorly performing regional networks are confronted with the prob-
lems of declining market shares, increasing ﬁnancial deﬁcits, and a running
down of existing infrastructure. These problems have arisen primarily due
to these railways’ inability to meet new competitive challenges, especially
from road transport. This stems mainly from government involvement. In
many instances, governments have required railways to pursue a range of
conﬂicting objectives, interfered with their day-to-day operations, and re-
stricted their access to capital. This has reduced the ability of these railways
to meet customer needs at competitive prices, which is further com-
pounded by the continual running down of the infrastructure base. At the
same time, governments have deregulated freight carried by road, exposing
rail to increasing competition.
Regional networks in Australia need to achieve both static and dynamic
eﬃciency gains if they are to survive in the competitive transport markets
in which they operate.
As the impediments to improved performance primarily stem from gov-
ernment involvement, the most eﬀective way of overcoming them is to in-
crease the commercial focus of regional networks. This requires that rail-
way managers have the ﬂexibility to make timely decisions, as well as the
ability to form strategic alliances, to access capital, and to face no undue
restrictions on input choice.
The commercial focus of government-owned railways can be improved
through corporatization. However, as noted earlier, there are often limita-
tions on how well the corporatization model is applied. In particular, gov-
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their railway boards because of political and community pressure.
The limitations of government ownership can be overcome through
greater private-sector participation by either franchising or full privatiza-
tion. Privatization of rollingstock and a long-term lease on infrastructure
are preferred to franchising in this case because it allows for greater com-
mercial focus and increased ﬂexibility.
Alternatively, the performance of regional railways could be improved
by encouraging competition between train operators through vertical sep-
aration combined with access arrangements. However, the small volumes
of freight carried on regional networks, and the resulting inability to
achieve economies of scale, suggest that proﬁtable entry by third-party op-
erators is likely to be limited in most instances. Importantly, as already
noted, there is competition from other transport modes, which would en-
courage improved performance by the incumbent operator. The impedi-
ment to improved performance is not a lack of competition but rather an
inability to meet existing competitive challenges.
Thus vertical integration appears to be appropriate for regional rail-
ways, since vertical separation makes little, if any, contribution to over-
coming the main impediments to improved performance.
Regional networks are also particularly suited to horizontal separation.
This would clearly delineate those markets where direct government in-
volvement is not required. Rail management would have the freedom to fo-
cus on developing new market opportunities and to increase operational
eﬃciency. “Light-handed” access arrangements can be tailored to ensure
that noncompeting trains from other networks can gain fair and reason-
able access. However, it is expected that access would not be an issue be-
cause owners would have incentives to provide access to noncompeting
trains as the increased traﬃc ﬂow could increase proﬁts to the track owner
or lessee.
11.7.3 Main Coal Lines
The main coal lines in Australia are deﬁned as the Hunter Valley coal
network in NSW and those lines centered on the Goonyella and South
Blackwater regions in Queensland. These networks carry high volumes,
are highly proﬁtable, and have a natural monopoly in the carriage of al-
most all coal in these regions (i.e., there is little competition from road or
rail-on-rail competition).
Unlike other rail networks in Australia, the main coal lines have main-
tained their market share in the transport of coal, and investment has been
easily justiﬁed on a strictly commercial basis. In this instance, the problems
associated with the main coal lines are those of market power and the ex-
traction of monopoly rents from mining companies, as well as ineﬃcient
operations.
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plement to control the existence of market power on the main coal lines.
First, competition between train operators could be encouraged, with mo-
nopoly pricing of the track infrastructure addressed through access regu-
lation. Alternatively, franchising of a vertically integrated network may be
used to promote competition “for” the market by awarding contracts for
the right to supply rail services (track and train). Tenders could be awarded
on the basis of the lowest total cost of service provision over a relevant pe-
riod. Track and rollingstock could be leased to the franchisee and access
conditions incorporated into franchise agreements.
The appeal of the ﬁrst approach is that competition between train oper-
ators can control monopoly pricing on the part of operators, while vertical
separation can increase the transparency of access-price regulation. How-
ever, there are some practical problems with this approach. In the ﬁrst in-
stance, sunk costs associated with investing in locomotives and wagons can
act as a substantial barrier to entry to potential new entrants. This prob-
lem is compounded by the fact that the rollingstock used to haul coal (es-
pecially the wagons) is speciﬁc to the haulage of bulk commodities, reduc-
ing its transferability to other rail markets.
In addition, even if eﬀective competition between train operators could
be achieved, the issue of monopoly pricing still exists in track infrastruc-
ture. The control of such monopoly power requires complex regulation.
Franchising has the advantages that the bidding process can be designed
to facilitate the transfer of assets (especially the rollingstock), removing
a substantial barrier to entry and making the market more contestable
(OECD 1999). The franchisee has commercial incentives to obtain dy-
namic eﬃciencies and lower costs by improving the role of railways in the
transport logistics chain between the mines and ports. In addition, fran-
chising reduces the need for prescriptive access regulation. Periodic re-
tendering and awarding contracts on the basis of the lowest freight rate can
help to reduce monopoly rents (PC 1999).
However, franchising is not a perfect or costless solution to controlling
monopoly pricing. The OECD (1999) identiﬁed three potential diﬃculties
with the franchising of rail services, including the possibility of uncompet-
itive bidding when there are insuﬃcient bidders, the diﬃculties of choosing
between bids that oﬀer diﬀerent packages, and the speciﬁcation and ad-
ministration of contracts.
On balance, the economic characteristics of the main coal lines suggest
that a process of franchising through competitive tendering is likely to be
superior to facilitating rail-on-rail competition. Government involvement
continues under both approaches through access regulation or the fran-
chise process and agreements. However, it is less certain that vertical sepa-
ration and access regulation will lead to new operators’ entering the mar-
ket owing to the sunk costs associated with the rollingstock required. As
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problem, making the market more contestable to potential operators.
To facilitate the franchising process, the main coal lines could be hori-
zontally separated from other networks. The isolation of the network, to-
gether with transparent information on the costs and revenues of the fran-
chise, would provide conﬁdence to coal companies that monopoly pricing
practices had been eliminated.
11.7.4 Interstate Network
The interstate network can be broadly deﬁned as the standard-gauge
track linking all mainland state capital cities. The markets served by the in-
terstate network are varied, including freight (generally containerized) and
interstate passenger services.
The ﬁnancial returns on the interstate network have traditionally been
poor. Although never highly proﬁtable, the proﬁtability of the NRC, which
carries freight on the interstate network, deteriorated signiﬁcantly after the
introduction of private operators on the network in 1995–1996 (PC 1999,
29).18 There is strong intermodal competition (from road and coastal ship-
ping) in almost all markets served by the interstate network.19 The key fea-
ture that diﬀerentiates the interstate network from regional networks is
that for the former there are multiple network owners, responsible for al-
locating train schedules and undertaking investment.
Currently the ARTC’s responsibilities for the interstate network are lim-
ited to the track that it owns (i.e., in South Australia and parts of NSW,
Western Australia, and Northern Territory) or manages (in Victoria). Op-
erators face signiﬁcant costs in negotiating access and train schedules with
numerous owners.20
Figure 11.2 shows that the interstate network initially lost considerable
market share to road, in both the transport of nonbulk freight and inter-
state passengers.21 The operating deﬁcits of the network have discouraged
investment, resulting in a deterioration of the infrastructure, further erod-
ing the competitive position of railways. It has been estimated that more
than half the expenditure of the commonwealth from the late 1970s to
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18. NRC made operating losses of between A$5 million and A$31 million in the period
1996–1997 to 1999–2000 and recorded a modest proﬁt before tax of A$2.3 million in 2000–
2001.
19. For example, in 1994–1995, the interstate transport of bulk commodities was domi-
nated by coastal shipping (95 percent of the market). In contrast, road dominated the trans-
port of nonbulk freight (57 percent of the market, compared to 32 percent for rail).
20. Currently, four authorities are responsible for the administration of access, ﬁve au-
thorities have a role in allocating train schedules, and ﬁve authorities undertake investment in
the network.
21. Rail market share of freight traﬃc on the east-west corridor reached a low of 65.2 per-
cent in 1995–1996 but has started to rise again, to 77 percent in 1999–2000, the highest level
in a decade. This in part reﬂects the recent growth in rail-on-rail competition from private
niche operators (ARTC 2001).1996–1997 covered operating losses and historical debt of its railway bod-
ies (HORSCCTMR 1998). This, it has been argued, diverted expenditure
from capital works. Some participants to the PC’s rail inquiry (1999, 237)
noted that there has also been “neglect” of the interstate network by state
governments. A number of reports in the 1990s (HORSCCTMR; Maun-
sell 1998; Booz-Allen and Hamilton 1998) presented evidence of the in-
adequacy of rail infrastructure. Participants to the PC’s inquiry also dis-
cussed the inadequacy of investment that contributed to problems in the
interstate network and hindered rail’s ability to compete (PC 1999, 236–
38).
There are two main underlying causes of the loss of competitiveness of
rail. First, government ownership and incentive arrangements have im-
peded the ability of train operators to improve operational eﬃciency and
achieve dynamic eﬃciency gains through market segmentation and better
integration into the transport logistics chain. Second, the multiplicity of
network managers imposes costs on train operators in negotiating train
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Fig. 11.2 Nonbulk interstate freight, Australia, 1970–1971 to 1994–1995
Source: PC (1999, 15), based on Perry and Gargett (1998).schedules and access charges. This impedes the eﬃcient allocation of train
schedules, overall use of the network, and investment.
These impediments can in part be overcome through the proposed pri-
vatization of NRC and encouragement of more rail-on-rail competition
from private niche operators. To overcome the problems associated with
multiple owners of the track infrastructure, integrated management of the
network is required. This could be achieved by establishing a single net-
work manager to manage the operation of the interstate track on behalf of
both train operators and track owners. This approach has a number of pos-
sible advantages. For instance, it reduces the coordination issues inherent
in having multiple managers of the network. It also avoids the conﬂicts of
interest that could arise if the manager also owned the track or rolling-
stock. An access regime could allow for train schedules to be allocated by
auctioning or other market trading methods. This would maximize the
economic value of the network by allocating train schedules to those oper-
ators that valued them the highest. Flexible pricing arrangements would
facilitate investment.
The successful implementation of this approach would be dependent on
the vertical separation of train operations from the track infrastructure.
This is to avoid any conﬂict of interest or diﬃculties that may arise from
one party both owning one segment of the network and providing train ser-
vices in competition with other operators.
11.8 Implications for Existing Arrangements
The diﬀerentiated approach described above has diﬀerent implications
in each Australian jurisdiction because of diﬀerences in the characteristics
of their railways. The potential for further reform exists in them all.
It has particular implications in states where coal lines are horizontally
integrated with the rest of the network (Queensland and NSW), or where
freight operations are still government-owned (Queensland and, until the
sale of FreightCorp was announced, NSW).
In NSW, consideration could also be given to going further and reinte-
grating the track and operations. It could adopt the Victorian model such
that the privatization of FreightCorp would involve a long-term lease over
the nonmetropolitan intrastate track (with appropriate access arrange-
ments). All passenger services could be franchised. The franchisees would
buy (or lease) the rollingstock and lease the track from the government.
Further reform of the interstate network has particular implications for
the commonwealth, NSW, and Western Australian governments. They are
currently owners of parts of the network and have separate access regimes.
The single-network-manager approach would be more eﬀective if the in-
terstate network were vertically separated and the manager did not own the
track infrastructure. This approach would allow coordinated management
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signiﬁcant beneﬁts and giving rail an opportunity to strengthen its com-
petitive position on this important transport corridor.
Further investigation could also show that the PC’s recommended ap-
proach may have relevance for some networks in other countries.
The European network, for example, traverses many countries in the
same way as Australia’s interstate network traverses a number of states. It
is used heavily by both freight and passenger trains. This suggests that the
approach suggested for Australia’s interstate network—involving vertical
separation and a single network manager—could be relevant in this con-
text.
Like Australia’s regional railways, Eastern European railways are often
heavily involved in moving general and bulk freight to ports. Where there
is already suﬃcient intermodal competition, consideration could be given
to greater private-sector participation in vertically integrated, horizontally
separated railways.
11.9 Conclusion
The Australian Productivity Commission considered that the overarch-
ing objective of rail reform should be to improve the eﬃciency of a coun-
try’s transport system. It argued that it should not be seen as a means of
involving the private sector to compensate for inadequate government
investment in loss-making railways.
An important conclusion from the PC inquiry was that the implementa-
tion of a common reform package is unlikely to overcome the impediments
to improved performance in all markets. Individualized approaches need
to be developed on a case-by-case basis for each type of rail network.
Crucial to developing individualized approaches is identifying the char-
acteristics of markets and their boundaries. Even where rail infrastructure
is considered a natural monopoly in a technological sense, other charac-
teristics inﬂuence the ability of providers to exercise market power and,
thus, the appropriate policy approach for a particular network. These char-
acteristics, which will diﬀer across rail networks, include the strength of
intermodal competition from air and road, the degree of competition in
downstream markets, and traﬃc density. Hence the appropriate structural
and ownership arrangements will diﬀer for long-distance, regional, and ur-
ban passenger rail networks.
Trade-oﬀs are inevitable. While vertical separation may assist in pro-
moting competition and reducing monopoly rents, it may result in a lack
of accountability, major coordination problems, and signiﬁcant safety
concerns, as evidenced in Great Britain and NSW. In particular, the imple-
mentation of strong access regulation to promote competition may dimin-
ish incentives for business to invest in maintaining and upgrading the rail
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viable businesses but interface issues between networks may arise. Where
viable, however, horizontal separation can allow diﬀerent policies to be im-
plemented for networks with diﬀerent characteristics.
Systematic analysis of structural reform and ownership options would
involve assessing the relevance and likely magnitude of the associated costs
and beneﬁts.
This paper has highlighted considerations that may be relevant to deter-
mining the preferred vertical structure of particular networks.
• Where there is suﬃcient intermodal competition and the possibility of
the development of rail-on-rail competition, vertical separation would
be appropriate. Beneﬁts are likely to be most signiﬁcant when infra-
structure and operations are relatively independent (OECD 1999).
• Where there is intermodal competition but little possibility of rail-on-
rail competition (e.g., where the potential market is small), gains from
vertical separation are unlikely to outweigh the costs. In this case, ver-
tical integration and promotion of competition for the market (e.g.,
through franchising) would be preferred.
• Where there is market power in the network, vertical integration may
also be appropriate. Periodic retendering and the awarding of con-
tracts on the basis of the lowest freight rate can help to reduce mo-
nopoly rents. Vertical separation, on the other hand, could result in
the transfer of monopoly rent from train to track operations. In addi-
tion, where there are barriers to entry, such as sunk costs in above-rail
operations, rail-on-rail competition is unlikely to develop.
In short, there can be no “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach to rail reform. Care
must be taken to ensure that the reform strategy adopted is relevant to the
network type, taking into account its economic characteristics, and that it
is implemented only when the gains exceed the costs.
11.9.1 Postscript
Since this paper was originally presented, the Australian rail reform pro-
cess has continued, including the sale of NRC and FreightCorp in January
2002, and the establishment of access arrangements for the parts of the in-
terstate network controlled by the ARTC.
In addition, several developments have highlighted diﬃculties that can
arise in implementing reform.
In December 2002, one of the private operators of the Victorian urban
rail passenger network (M-Train), which had incurred large ﬁnancial
losses, withdrew from the system. (Its part of the network is being operated
by receivers on behalf of the Victorian government, until a decision is made
about longer-term arrangements.) Several factors are likely to have con-
tributed to M-Train’s withdrawal. In part, it may reﬂect problems with hor-
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vidual providers with a market that is too small or fragmented. Connex, the
current operator of the other part of the system, argued that horizontally
separating the Victorian urban network has been ineﬃcient, and has ex-
pressed interest in operating the whole system (J. Masanauskas, “Train
Stations Are Just ‘Crap,’” Herald Sun,4 February 2003, p. 8). Thus, the at-
tempt by the Victorian government to adopt a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to
its urban network, by emulating the United Kingdom, appears to have
failed because it paid insuﬃcient attention to local conditions, particularly
the relatively small size of the market. This does not, however, undermine
the principle of horizontally separating the urban rail passenger network
from other rail networks.
In 2001, investment disincentives—purportedly created by the pricing
rules for the rail freight access regimes in Victoria and NSW—were raised
as an issue to a PC inquiry into the Australian national access regime (PC
2001). The potential “chilling” eﬀect of access regulation for investment
(in all industries) was highlighted as a major concern in the commission’s
ﬁnal report (2001). It suggested some general principles that would allow
access regimes to facilitate eﬃcient new investment. These included setting
regulated access prices to generate expected revenue that at least meets the
eﬃcient long-run costs of providing access, that covers the directly attrib-
utable or incremental costs of service provision, and that includes a return
commensurate with (regulatory and commercial) risk.
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Comment John McMillan
This paper comprehensively lays out the pros and cons of the alternative
mechanisms of railway reform, and gives a useful catalogue of where they
apply.
The main point of the paper bears repeating, as it is very important:
there is no uniquely right approach to railway reform. What works in one
set of circumstances fails in another. One size doesn’t ﬁt all.
The approaches to rail reform include downsizing (by means of either
horizontal or vertical separation of activities), corporatization, privatiza-
tion, and oﬀering access to the tracks by competitive service providers.
Each of these approaches has its place, as Helen Owens explains.
The bad news, a corollary of one size doesn’t ﬁt all, is that any approach
to reform necessarily has some shortcomings. Choosing the best feasible
solution means making trade-oﬀs and compromises. Whatever solution is
adopted, there will always be room for critics to ﬁnd fault with it.
It is the complexity of the exercise of railway reform that means one size
doesn’t ﬁt all. The railway industry is harder than most industries to reform
successfully, for several reasons.
First, the system of tracks creates a natural-monopoly element, meaning
that competition is hard to achieve. One of the main lessons from the post-
1980s privatization exercises in many industries around the world is that
privatization often fails to bring its intended eﬃciency gains where the pri-
vatized ﬁrm remains a monopoly. It is not enough merely to transfer assets
to private hands and rely on the proﬁt motive to induce the new owners to
improve the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency. The discipline of competition is also needed.
It is diﬃcult to run a ﬁrm as a lean operation if its managers do not feel the
continual pressure of competition. In railways, with limited scope for com-
petition, privatization is not guaranteed to bring major eﬃciency gains.
Second, the policymaker must take account of externalities. Road trans-
portation brings large negative externalities, from congestion, pollution,
and accidents. The Federal Highway Administration estimates that the un-
compensated negative externalities from driving in the United States come
to some $330 billion per year. To the extent that railways reduce these ex-
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Business, Stanford University.ternalities, some form of public support is warranted. Especially for urban
commuter rail systems, externality arguments justify public subsidy. This
complicates any attempt to privatize or corporatize railways, for simple
proﬁtability may not, from a social point of view, be the right criterion for
evaluating performance.
Third, the coordination of timetables can be complex, and can raise
safety concerns. If multiple rail companies use common tracks, some form
of central coordination is needed to avoid crashes.
Finally, technological progress is unlikely to come to the rescue of the re-
formers. In telecommunications, for instance, technological advances in
the 1980s and 1990s reduced the scope of natural monopolies, and made
reform easier than it would have been earlier. Such dramatic technological
change seems unlikely in railways.
For these reasons it is a delicate matter to judge just which mix of mar-
ket forces and government control is the right one in any particular set of
circumstances, as the paper makes clear.
There is one form of ongoing technological progress, however, that may
over time change this mix: the design of market mechanisms. Paul Brewer
and Charles Plott designed a mechanism for scheduling the use of the
Swedish railways. Multiple rail ﬁrms used the common, publicly owned
tracks (Brewer and Plott 1996). To generate consistent schedules and avoid
train crashes, the traditional approach to scheduling was for a committee
to centrally set the timetable. The Brewer-Plott mechanism attempts to
capture the informational beneﬁts of decentralized decision making. The
rail users bid for the right to use speciﬁc lengths of track at speciﬁc times.
An algorithm ﬁrst retains only the highest bids. Then it sorts the bids into
all possible combinations that are feasible, meaning they respect safety
margins for track use. Finally, it computes the bid total for each of the fea-
sible combinations. The combination with the highest bid total is declared
the provisional winner. Now a new round of bids is called for, and the pro-
cess repeats until no one wants to bid higher. In experiments, this mecha-
nism works well, in eliciting close to eﬃcient allocations.
The lesson from the Brewer-Plott mechanism is that we should not un-
derestimate what markets can do. As computing power increases and as
economists’ ability to design sophisticated bidding mechanisms expands,
the balance of the trade-oﬀs Helen Owens analyzes will change.
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